The Owl Explains Hootenanny

This episode discusses lending platforms on blockchains. Thomas Rivera (McGill University) and Quentin Vandeweyer (University of Chicago) explain that lending platforms generate sub-optimal welfare due to under-utilization of funds that are lent to the platform. To provide more context, lending platforms are specified in such a way that the level of borrowing (relative to lending) necessarily fluctuates with market conditions, resulting in instances where borrowing is significantly below lending. Importantly, when borrowing is significantly below lending, the total interest accrued from borrowers (relative to lending volume) is necessarily low, yielding low interest rates for lenders and thereby discouraging lending. Potential improvements for lending platforms are discussed. Paper: Equilibrium in a DeFi Lending Market

This episode discusses a phenomenon known as Just-In-Time Liquidity at Decentralized Exchanges. Agostino Capponi (Columbia University) explains that, while this phenomenon is generally viewed as positive for liquidity demanders, it can actually undermine liquidity provision. More specifically, JIT liquidity providers can pick-and-choose the best trades, which reduces the incentive for passive liquidity providers to offer liquidity. The consequent reduction in passive liquidity can lead to lower overall liquidity. Paper: The Paradox Of Just-In-Time Liquidity In Decentralized Exchanges: More Can Sometimes Mean Less

Brett Falk (University of Pennsylvania) and Gerry Tsoukalas (Boston University) discuss voting protocols in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations. Brett Falk (University of Pennsylvania) and Gerry Tsoukalas (Boston University) highlight weaknesses in existing voting protocols. An important point is that many voting protocols weight votes based on token holdings but a voter’s token holdings does not, in general, reflect the level of information that the voter has with regard to a voting proposal. The consequence of this misalignment between a voter’s weight and a voter’s information is suboptimal welfare outcomes. Paper: Token-Weighted Crowdsourcing and Balancing Power in Decentralized Governance

Lewis Cohen (DLx Law) discusses whether cryptoassets are securities from the perspective of US law. Lewis Cohen (DLx Law) explains the relevant US securities laws and then highlights how cryptoassets can differ from traditional securities. A key point is that many cryptoassets do not confer rights in the manner of traditional securities, instead conferring abilities. Cryptoassets thus might require a novel regulatory framework. Paper: The Ineluctable Modality of Securities Law