Feb 3, 2025

From Wild West to Foundation of Finance: The Case for Public Permissionless Blockchains

The Owl
By and The Owl
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As recently as three or four  years ago, if you were a central bank,  financial institution or large enterprise wanting to experiment with blockchain technology, it would be a no-brainer to choose a private, permissioned network. Public permissionless blockchains were - and in many cases still are - viewed as a Wild West of DeFi lawlessness and NFT-driven hedonism. However, the tide is rapidly turning, and in the past couple of years we’ve seen increased interest from banks in building on public blockchain. Even the Bank for International Settlements - the ‘central bank of central banks’ - has started to run projects built on public blockchain

In this article we’re going to explain what public permissionless blockchains are, the benefits they can bring, and some examples of how financial institutions are already building on them. We’ll then look at why so many people in both the public and private sectors  have historically been inherently against public permissionless blockchains, what’s changing in terms of both technology developments and public perception, and how the barriers previously perceived by regulators and regulated entities are being broken down.

But first, let’s start with a few definitions. 

What do we mean when we say "public" and "permissionless"?

Public blockchains are open and accessible to anyone. Anyone can join the network, view the ledger and validate transactions, without any restrictions. In this respect, they’re fully decentralized and self-governing, and have a high degree of autonomy and resilience. 

Permissionless means that there are no gatekeeping requirements associated with access to and participation in the blockchain, and nobody needs special permission in order to join, validate or develop applications on the network.  

While these terms often overlap, they are not entirely synonymous. A blockchain can be public but not entirely permissionless if, for example, only authorized nodes can validate transactions (as in some ‘hybrid’ models, like Hedera). Conversely, a permissionless blockchain is typically public, as it relies on open participation to maintain its decentralized ethos. But taken together, these qualities underpin the trustless and open nature of many blockchain systems, enabling broad participation.


What are some of the benefits of public permissionless blockchains?

Public permissionless blockchains don’t rely  on a central authority exercising power and control to create trust between unknown counterparties. The ‘trust’ in this instance comes from the combination of decentralization, robust consensus mechanisms and economic incentives, cryptographic security, transparency and immutability of public blockchains. This decentralization eliminates single points of failure, making these networks more resilient against outages or cyberattacks. Open access allows global participation, enabling a broad range of developers and institutions to build and integrate applications, driving innovation, liquidity, and diverse use cases through composable ecosystems.

Network effects also play a role. The larger and more established a blockchain's user base, the more secure and trustworthy it becomes. This is because a larger network typically has more nodes validating transactions, making attacks less feasible. Public blockchains also often rely on open-source software, allowing the best developers and security experts globally to test, audit and improve the code. This open scrutiny helps identify vulnerabilities and maintain robustness. For the blockchain community, it’s axiomatic that all this is better: safer, more reliable, more universal.

Permissioned networks are still great for certain applications, particularly those in which there are a limited number of participants who all need to be on-boarded and known to each other,  implementing a very specific use case and with no need to interact with a broader range of participants or assets. But there’s an increasing recognition of the benefits that public permissionless blockchains bring for asset tokenization: distribution and liquidity, the benefits of a diverse ecosystem, and other network effects. 


Why and how are regulated financial institutions starting to use public blockchain?

Issue an asset on a private permissioned network and it’s available only for the use case implemented on that network, and to the participants in that network. Issue onto a public permissionless blockchain, and your tokenized asset can be accessible to any participant. It can be exchanged bilaterally between wallet-holders, picked up and integrated into decentralized exchanges or used as collateral in lending protocols. 

Users can pay for them in any stablecoins available on the network, or swap them directly for other tokenized assets. It can also be composed with other tokenized assets into use cases and applications that you as an issuer might never have foreseen. It can be bridged onto other public permissionless blockchains and made available to their ecosystems. All of this distribution capability drives greater liquidity and innovation - and that’s evidenced by the growing trend towards tokenized fund issuance on public chains. 

A growing recognition of these benefits - alongside all the other benefits of the technology - is fueling more experimentation and a growing cohort of live projects on public chains. Some high-profile examples include:

What are the regulators’  concerns about public permissionless blockchain?

Regulators often start from some assumptions that challenge the benefits or need for public permissionless blockchains. Essentially, because of the way regulation works in the traditional financial sector, this initial mistrust comes out of  how different institutions and parts of the financial, regulatory and technology ecosystems look at the world. They see the words ‘public’ and ‘permissionless’ and conflate these with a lack of control over activities that should be regulated, and an inability to apply concepts like AML and KYC to participants. There’s a clash between worldviews.


Are these concerns justified?

A public blockchain typically isn’t a single application. It’s a network-based technology platform on which a range of applications and protocols can be built. These protocols themselves can have on-boarding requirements. Permissioning can also be implemented at the token level, so that tokens can only be transferred in accordance with predefined requirements. 

Nevertheless, public blockchains are increasingly recognizing the importance and value of supporting different permissioning mechanisms. Multichain blockchains, such as Avalanche and Cosmos, enable the creation of specialized blockchains, sometimes referred to as subnets or app-chains, that can be compliant by design. In these systems, developers can create chains with custom rule sets, execution environments, and governance regimes tailored to their needs. These custom blockchains unlock use cases previously not possible on blockchains with single rule sets, and isolate traffic and data into environments purpose-built for a given use case. They can also be natively interoperable with their mainnets and with other custom chains in the same network, enabling more of a balance to be struck between control and distribution of tokenized assets. 


Why go public and permissionless?

Just as we don’t try today to control who has access to the internet and who can build on it, regulators and governments don’t need to try to control public blockchains to mitigate potential risks from them. They come with significant, in-built benefits in terms of robustness, security and resilience. Additionally, public and permissionless at the blockchain technology level is not synonymous with public and permissionless at the application level, and this is where regulators should focus their attention. There are many mechanisms available to implement robust compliance at the protocol and token level, while still benefiting from the network effects of a diverse, innovative ecosystem.  

As we’ve seen, there are valid use cases for both private, permissioned and public, permissionless blockchains, and both will continue to exist, and co-exist, into the future. Which one you use for your business will depend on the outcomes you wish to achieve, and how that aligns with the relative attributes of different blockchains. More and more actors both in the crypto space and traditional financial system are realising that public, permissionless blockchains can be a strong foundation for new ways of doing business.

Articles

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2025-09-15

Bridging the Pacific: How Hong Kong and the US are Shaping the Future of Stablecoins

We are grateful for the expertise of Urszula McCormack and Grace Qiu of King & Wood Mallesons on the Hong Kong law aspects of this post. Our embrace of 2025 as “the Year of the Stablecoin” continues. Previously, we compared emerging regulation in the UK and the US as well as the EU and the US. Now we turn our attention halfway around the world to look at Hong Kong as compared with the US. If you read our previous notes, you will already be familiar with the US points. On July 18, President Trump signed into law the long awaited the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act, establishing the first regulatory framework for so-called “payment stablecoins” (seemingly just about any stablecoin). Hot on the heels of this development, the Hong Kong Stablecoins Ordinance (Cap. 656) (Stablecoins Ordinance) came into effect on August 1st. Hong Kong’s banking regulator - the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) – is the primary licensing body and regulator for stablecoins issuers and has issued the following guidance: Guideline on Supervision of Licensed Stablecoin Issuers” (Supervision Guideline). Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (For Licensed Stablecoin Issuers) (AML/CFT Guideline). Collectively, these three documents comprise the regulatory framework for the regulation of issuers and their “specified stablecoins” (currently, stablecoins linked to any official currency).  Understanding the differences between the Hong Kong and US approaches to regulating stablecoins provides insights not just for issuers, but for global market design and those thinking broadly about the potential impacts of a world full of stablecoins in multiple currencies. We briefly compare and contrast key aspects of the two regimes and suggest what this means in practice. Scene Setting Both regimes regulate the issuance of stablecoins and the issuers and intermediaries who support them. In Hong Kong, the regulation of the licensing and conduct of intermediaries remains with their primary regulators (e.g., the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) regulates multiple financial services and “virtual asset” (i.e., crypto) intermediaries).  We recently commented on consultations by the Hong Kong regulators concerning the regulation of virtual asset dealers (e.g., market makers) and virtual asset custodians.  The US does not yet have a comprehensive federal regulatory regime for crypto-assets or the associated intermediaries. In Congress, the House of Representative has passed the CLARITY Act, which would provide such a regime.  However, the Senate has yet to pass legislation on the topic, although the Senate Banking Committee has provided a discussion draft and request for information.  The relevant regulators, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, have each started the information gathering process that is a precursor to rule making.  We have submitted proposed frameworks for rule-makings by the CFTC and the SEC to cover intermediaries’ activities with respect to crypto-assets, specifically protocol tokens. The two stablecoin frameworks start with similar definitions of stablecoins:  essentially those fiat-denominated tokens that can be used in payments.  In Hong Kong, the definition of “specified stablecoins” also extends to stablecoins that reference “units of account” or “stores of economic value” specified by the HKMA. While the HKMA has not specified any as of the date of this post, we consider that the Hong Kong regime may, in the future, extend to stablecoins that reference physical commodities like gold. In the US, stablecoins linked to other assets are left to other regulation.  We Owls have explained how regulation of these other assets might work, including to the SEC Crypto Task Force in our April 23 submission.  In Hong Kong, several exemptions apply, including assets that are “securities”, leaving open the prospect of stablecoins being regulated under different regimes based on the legal structure of the asset, an approach we have long endorsed.  Verdict: For now, Hong Kong is somewhat ahead of the US in terms of comprehensive intermediary regulation but on the remaining points the two regimes are aligned. Let’s dig a bit into the details, comparing and contrasting the two approaches. Both include the requirement that issuers maintain 1:1 backing of their stablecoins with high-quality, liquid reserve assets (essentially cash and cash equivalents), and standards for who may issue a stablecoin, redemption rights, disclosures, and custody of the backing assets.   Keeping It In Reserve In Hong Kong, an issuer must hold reserve assets (referred to as “eligible assets”), which include the following:  Cash. Bank deposits with a term of no longer than three (3) months. Marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by a government, central bank, public sector entity etc that have residual maturity of no longer than one (1) year that meet certain criteria (e.g. calculation of credit risk). Cash receivable from overnight reverse repurchase agreements with minimal counterparty risk, collaterized by marketable debt securities.  Investment funds that invest in the assets set out above; where such investment funds are set up for the sole purpose of managing the reserve assets of a licensee. Other types of assets which are acceptable to the HKMA. Tokenized representations of the eligible assets.  In the US, an issuer’s stablecoins must be backed up one-to-one by eligible instruments, such as the following: US currency, demand deposits or deposits held at Federal Reserve Banks. Treasury bills or bonds with a maturity of 93 days or less. Funding secured through a repurchase agreement backed by T-bills and cleared at a registered Central Clearing Agency (CCA). Securities issued by a registered investment company or other money market fund. Any similarly liquid federal government-issued assets approved by the issuer’s regulators. Tokenized versions of eligible instruments that comply with applicable laws. Both jurisdictions require that the reserves be segregated and not commingled with the issuer’s operational funds. In Hong Kong, reserve asset pools for each type of stablecoin (e.g., for different currencies) must also be segregated from other reserve asset pools, and adequately protected against claims by other creditors of the licensee. Verdict: Overall aligned, with in-principle greater flexibility in Hong Kong due to the slightly wider range of permitted backing assets. Both regimes also expressly permit using tokenized versions of permitted backing assets. A Shot At Redemption In Hong Kong, licensees must provide each holder a right to redeem at par value, and must not attach any condition restricting redemption that is “unduly burdensome” or charge a fee in connection with redemption unless it is “reasonable.” A licensee must honor a valid redemption request “as soon as practicable.” The Supervision Guideline indicates that, unless otherwise approved, valid redemption requests should be processed within one (1) business day after the day on which they are received. In addition, a licensee must make adequate and timely disclosure to the public on redemption rights for stablecoins issued (e.g. fee, conditions, procedures and time within which a request may be processed). In the US, customers must have a clear, enforceable right to redeem stablecoins for the reference currency (e.g., U.S. dollars) on demand. The GENIUS Act requires issuers to publish a redemption policy that promises “timely redemption” of stablecoins for fiat, with any fees disclosed in plain language and capped (fees can only be changed with seven days’ notice). Regulators are expected to formalize operational expectations in the required implementing rule-makings. Verdict: Very similar, though with some differences such as the GENIUS Act not expressly requiring “reasonable” fees. The HKMA’s guidelines has also expressly specified a one (1) business day processing timeline for redemption requests. What’s The Issue(ance) Hong Kong’s Stablecoins Ordinance has a relatively novel territorial scope.  Specifically, issuers require a licence – and their stablecoins subject to stringent rules – where they: issue any fiat currency-referenced stablecoin in Hong Kong in the course of business;  issue HKD-referenced stablecoins anywhere in the world, in the course of business; or actively market to the public that they carry on any of the above activities, unless exempt. In this post, we refer to this as the “Hong Kong nexus test”. There is no express exemption in the Stablecoins Ordinance for foreign issuers (e.g. if subject to “comparable” or “reciprocal” regulation). In addition, an application may only be made by a company incorporated in Hong Kong, or an authorized institution (e.g. bank) incorporated outside Hong Kong.  That said, an offshore issuance may not violate the Stablecoins Ordinance if the Hong Kong nexus test summarized above is not met.  This introduces complexity for intermediaries who need to then assess carefully whether the issuance required Hong Kong approval. In turn, stablecoins can only be offered by regulated intermediaries.  Currently, as there are not yet any HKMA-approved stablecoins, these offers must only be to “professional investors”.  More on this in our commentary further below. The GENIUS Act’s general rule is that only U.S.-regulated issuers can directly issue stablecoins to U.S. users, but it creates a possible exception for foreign issuers that meet strict criteria and obtain a form of U.S. approval. Foreign issuers may issue stablecoins in the U.S., and digital asset service providers may offer or sell such issuer’s payment stablecoin, if the foreign issuer: Is subject to regulation and supervision by a foreign regulator that the U.S. Treasury determines is “comparable” to the regulatory and supervisory regime under GENIUS, a determination which Treasury has 210 days to make; Is registered with the OCC; Holds reserves in a U.S. financial institution sufficient to meet liquidity demands of U.S. customers; and The foreign jurisdiction in which the issuer is based is not subject to comprehensive economic sanctions.  Verdict: The GENIUS Act has more inherent flexibility by including an express exemption for foreign issuers that meet relevant criteria. Hong Kong’s regime will require every stablecoin issuer to assess whether licensing is required, based on whether they meet the Hong Kong nexus test set out above. No Interest In That Both the GENIUS Act and the Stablecoins Ordinance do not allow stablecoin issuers to pay their holders any form of interest or yield (whether in the form of cash, tokens or other consideration) if it is solely related to holding, retention or use of the coins.  Both are silent on other types of programs such as rebates to intermediaries that might be passed on to consumers, although in Hong Kong, incentives are generally covered by (separate) conduct requirements imposed by the relevant regulator. In both instances, it seems that the boundary between prohibited yield and permissible rewards tied to other activity may be subject to future rule-making and regulatory interpretation.  Verdict: Aligned What About Implementation? In Hong Kong, the Stablecoins Ordinance came into effect on August 1, 2025. The implementation timeline is as follows: Pre-existing issuers must apply for a license within 3-months for transitional relief. Issuers that do not apply will enter into a 1-month closing down period at the end of the 3-month period. Issuers who successfully apply within the 3-month period can continue to operate while their license application is under review.  Distributors and other intermediaries do not have a transitional period (ie restrictions are live). No offering of specified stablecoins is allowed unless a person is a “permitted offer.” The GENIUS Act becomes effective on the earlier of 18 months after enactment - that is, January 18, 2027, or 120 days after the primary federal payment stablecoin regulators (e.g. Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, SEC/CFTC) issue final implementing regulations. Additionally, within 1 year of enactment (i.e. by July 18, 2026), Primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators, The Secretary of the Treasury, and each state payment stablecoin regulator must issue proposed and final rules via notice-and-comment. Three years after enactment (by July 18, 2028) it becomes unlawful for any digital-asset service provider (e.g., exchanges, custodial wallets) to offer or sell payment stablecoins in the US unless those stablecoins are issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer under the Act. So, what does that actually mean for firms? Market participants have roughly 12 months (until mid‑2026) to prepare for proposed regulatory standards. Full compliance requirements kick in by early 2027, unless regulators finalize rules sooner. Digital-asset platforms must ensure that all payment stablecoins offered in the U.S. are issued by authorized entities by mid‑2028. Up until then, platforms may continue to offer and sell stablecoins that have not been issued by permitted stablecoin issuers. Verdict: Hong Kong’s shorter time frames will mean a race for issuers to comply. The View From The Nest While both jurisdictions bring stablecoin activity within the regulatory perimeter, their paths diverge in meaningful ways. Hong Kong’s regime focuses on financial market stability, and bank-level safeguards on reserve assets, while the US approach is more explicitly centered on payment system stability and state–federal alignment around issuer regulation. Whether this divergence ultimately fosters jurisdictional competition, interoperability or friction will depend on how these rules are implemented - and how responsive they remain to a market still evolving at speed. A key challenge for Hong Kong is the highly restrictive approach to offering stablecoins.  To do so, one must be a “permitted offeror” – that is, either a regulated issuer (none yet) or in one of the stated classes of intermediaries already regulated by the HKMA or the SFC.  Given the scope of Hong Kong’s current laws, this leaves one critical class out of the mix - OTC dealers of virtual assets – who are currently waiting for their regulatory regime to be finalised and implemented.  In addition, retail investors are left out in the cold for now.  Until the HKMA approves a stablecoin, even “permitted offerors” can only offer to “professional investors”.  However, the devil is always in the detail – not every interaction with a stablecoin is an “offer” that falls within the Stablecoins Ordinance restrictions. -----– We intend to host some local invite-only events in various locations around the world in the coming months to learn more about how the experts are thinking about stablecoins and their impacts on payments, banking and the overall digital economy. We will share the key themes from each event with everyone.

The Owl
By and The Owl
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2025-09-11

Two paths diverged? How the US and EU treat stablecoins

Last time, we explored the similarities and differences between the GENIUS Act’s approach to stablecoins and the latest proposals in the UK. We showed that there were areas of broad alignment, but also some areas of clear difference. The reason for this is the different ambitions each country has for the growth of their stablecoin (and broader digital asset) sectors, set against two very different regulatory systems. In this post we will compare the US framework with the EU’s regulation around stablecoins, which can be found in its Markets in Cryptoassets Regulation (known as MiCA). MiCA covers more than just stablecoins and provides comprehensive crypto-asset regulation for Europe, including regulation of intermediaries (known as crypto-asset service providers or CASPs).  The US does not yet have a comprehensive federal regulatory regime for crypto-assets or the associated intermediaries. In Congress, the House of Representative has passed the CLARITY Act, which would provide such a regime.  However, the Senate has yet to pass legislation on the topic, although the Senate Banking Committee has provided a discussion draft and request for information.  The relevant regulators, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, have each started the information gathering process that is a precursor to rule making.  We have submitted proposed frameworks for rulemakings by the CFTC and the SEC to cover intermediaries’ activities with respect to crypto-assets, specifically protocol tokens.  Verdict:  For now, Europe is somewhat ahead of the US in terms of comprehensive intermediary regulation. We expect stablecoins to have implications for payments, banking and commerce more generally, so it seems appropriate that they have their own set of regulations, as is the case in both the US and the EU.  As a quick reminder, on 18 July 2025, President Trump signed the GENIUS Act into law, establishing the first US federal framework for so-called “payment stablecoins” (which include pretty much any existing stablecoin). In the EU, however, MiCA’s stablecoin provisions came into force across all 27 EU member states much earlier, in June 2024. It creates a bespoke regime for stablecoins, which it separates into two types: e-money tokens (EMTs) and asset-referenced tokens (ARTs) depending on what basket of assets the token refers to. Although the two regimes were developed in very different political and economic circumstances, there are - just like with the UK - certain areas of core overlap. But there are also, of course, some notable differences. Let’s unpack it. Scene Setting Both regimes regulate the issuance of stablecoins as well as the issuers and intermediaries who support them. They start from slightly different definitions: in the US, “payment stablecoins” broadly include any fiat-denominated token used for payments, while in the EU, the split is explicit between EMTs (tokens referencing a single fiat currency) and ARTs (tokens referencing multiple currencies or non-fiat assets). Stablecoins linked to other assets are left to other, as yet undefined regulation in the US, but captured as ARTs in the EU. In both frameworks, 1:1 backing of fiat-denominated coins is a core principle, with detailed reserve, disclosure, and redemption requirements.  Verdict: For now, Europe is ahead of the US by recognizing other types of stablecoins beyond fiat-linked. Keeping It In Reserve In the EU, MiCA requires that EMTs be fully backed by assets denominated in the same currency as the reference, held in custody with an authorized credit institution or central bank. Eligible assets are limited to: Cash deposits. These must be at least 30% of reserves held as commercial bank deposits (or 60% if the stablecoin is deemed ‘significant’); Government securities with minimal market and credit risk; and Other highly liquid instruments approved by the EBA. ARTs have similar prudential and governance requirements varied just to reflect that they reference value other than a non-single, non-fiat currency (though to date no ARTs appear to have been issued in the EU). In the US, an issuer’s stablecoins must be backed one-to-one by eligible instruments, such as: US currency, demand deposits or deposits held at Federal Reserve Banks; Treasury bills or bonds with a maturity of 93 days or less; Repo funding secured by T-bills cleared at a registered CCA; Securities issued by registered money market funds; Other liquid federal government assets approved by regulators; and Tokenized versions of eligible instruments. Both jurisdictions prohibit commingling of reserve assets with operational funds. Verdict: Broadly aligned, though the EU mandates more commercial bank deposit-backing and have provision for stablecoins beyond fiat-linked. A Shot At Redemption In the EU, EMT issuers must grant holders the right of redemption at par value, at any time, in fiat currency. Redemption must occur “promptly,” and for free, though MiCA allows some operational flexibility (no fixed T+1 requirement, unlike the UK). For ARTs, redemption rights exist but are subject to additional conditions given the potential volatility of the reference basket. In the US, customers must have a clear, enforceable right to redeem stablecoins for fiat on demand. The GENIUS Act requires issuers to publish a redemption policy promising “timely redemption” with capped and disclosed fees. Verdict: Aligned, though the EU requires redemption to be without fees. What’s The Issue(ance) Under MiCA, only authorized credit institutions (banks) or electronic money institutions may issue EMTs. ARTs can be issued by other regulated entities, but must meet additional governance and capital requirements. Importantly, MiCA applies uniformly across the EU, with no national discretion (so-called ‘EU passporting’).  Foreign issuers can issue EMTs or ARTs in the EU only if they establish an authorized entity within the Union. Foreign-issued stablecoin usage (for stablecoins that would be deemed EMTs under MiCA) are capped at 1 million transactions per day and 200 million EUR value for stablecoins not pegged to an EU-currency. The GENIUS Act’s general rule is that only U.S.-regulated issuers can directly issue stablecoins to U.S. users, with a narrow exception for foreign issuers from “comparable” jurisdictions, provided they register with the OCC and maintain reserves in U.S. institutions.   Unlike Europe, which does not allow member states to regulate any type of crypto-asset, the GENIUS Act allows for stablecoin issuers to choose either federal or state regulation, so long as the dollar amount of stablecoins issued remains below $10 billion.  The law sets the minimum standards for both federal and state regulation, but state regulators may impose greater standards and in any event have the ability to set the detailed requirements of the regulations.  In Europe, those details are handled by MiCA. Verdict: Not aligned. The US provides a possible route for foreign issuers (although future rules from the regulators might narrow the realistic opportunity for foreign issuers in the US). The EU requires a fully in-scope local entity for EU issuance or limits on usage. Additionally, the US allows for state regulation, while MiCA prohibits member states from regulating on matters that are within its scope. No Interest In That Both the GENIUS Act and MiCA prohibit stablecoin issuers from paying interest or yield directly tied to holding or using the token. MiCA is explicit that EMTs cannot generate returns, to preserve their similarity to e-money. ARTs are also prohibited from offering yield unless linked to other activities approved by regulators. Verdict: Aligned. What About Implementation? In the EU, MiCA was written into law in 2023, with the stablecoin provisions (Titles III and IV) applying from June 2024. However, supervisory enforcement only builds up gradually: By 2025, all EMT and ART issuers must be authorized. Existing operators had a limited grandfathering period but must transition to full compliance by end-2025. The EBA and ESMA are expected to refine technical standards through 2026. The GENIUS Act becomes effective the earlier of January 18, 2027, or 120 days after implementing regulations are finalized. Proposed rules are due by mid-2026, with full compliance required by early 2027. By mid-2028, all payment stablecoins offered in the U.S. must be issued by permitted entities. Verdict: Not yet aligned. The EU regime has already started, with stablecoin rules already live, whereas the US regime will not fully be in force until 2027–2028. The View From The Nest While both jurisdictions have moved to bring stablecoin activity within the regulatory perimeter, their paths diverge in meaningful ways. The EU’s MiCA regime cements a highly harmonized framework across 27 member states, with tighter prudential and governance requirements. This regime is also notably protective of EU monetary sovereignty and seeks to limit the ability of non-EU currencies to circulate inside the EU. This implies a fundamental global fragmentation of the stablecoin market.  The US approach is more focused on payment system stability and creating federal-state coherence around issuers, but leaves significant discretion for regulators in implementation. In terms of international stablecoin usage within the US, the GENIUS Act is (perhaps unsurprisingly given the global role of the US dollar) more relaxed. Whether this divergence ultimately fosters beneficial jurisdictional competition, interoperability or simply friction and fragmentation will depend on how these rules are enforced, and how responsive the two jurisdictions are to a rapidly evolving market. There is still scope for both regimes to treat each other as equivalent for practical purposes and so create interoperability between the two jurisdictions. But it is just as possible that questions of monetary sovereignty and infrastructure independence will lead to persistent fragmentation between the two great Transatlantic markets. -----– We intend to host some local invite-only events in various locations around the world in the coming months to learn more about how the experts are thinking about stablecoins and their impacts on payments, banking and the overall digital economy. We will share the key themes from each event with everyone.

The Owl
By and The Owl
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2025-09-08

Crypto Summer Heats Up as Senate Kicks Off Digital Asset Market Structure

A New Beginning It’s been almost ten years since lawmakers started circling the big question: how do you regulate an industry that’s redefining what assets even are? Congress’s efforts to pass digital asset legislation finally broke through with the historic enactment of the GENIUS Act (stablecoins) and the passage of the CLARITY Act (market structure) in the House of Representatives—passing 294-134, with 78 Democrats voting in favor.  The Senate is now considering market structure, with two competing bills vying for attention: the House’s CLARITY Act and the Senate Banking Committee’s discussion draft of the Responsible Financial Innovation Act of 2025 (RFIA), made public in late July by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Scott, Sen. Cynthia Lummis (Chair of the Subcommittee on Digital Assets), Sen. Bill Hagerty (the primary force behind the GENIUS Act), and Sen. Bernie Moreno. Along with the draft RFIA, the group released a wide‑ranging Request for Information (RFI), seeking feedback on many topics including definitions of terms, issuer disclosures, trading venue obligations, custody, insolvency, illicit finance, bank activities, trading by insiders, and federal preemption of state laws.  Since the Senate Banking Committee has oversight authority over the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) but not the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Senate Agriculture Committee will develop its own language to be combined with the RFIA to address the areas that will be within the CFTC’s remit.  Comparing RFIA and CLARITY  Here’s where things get technical and interesting: the starting point for each bill is very different because of the way each defines the assets that will be regulated. CLARITY calls the relevant asset a “digital commodity,” which is defined as “a digital asset that is intrinsically linked to a blockchain system, and the value of which is derived from or is reasonably expected to be derived from the use of the blockchain system (emphasis added).” RFIA uses the term “ancillary asset,” which is defined as “an intangible, commercially fungible asset, including a digital commodity, that is offered, sold, or otherwise distributed to a person in connection with the purchase and sale of a security through an arrangement that constitutes an investment contract (emphasis added)” and does not include an asset that provides certain financial rights. Ancillary asset seems the much broader definition because it encompasses any asset that is the subject of an investment contract, while digital commodity is limited to assets that are native to blockchain networks. Yes, this part is dense, but definitions like this decide what and who gets regulated, and how. Despite this vast difference, the two bills proceed to specify regulatory regimes that are fairly similar. Both focus on the existence of an investment contract as the trigger for the obligations and regulatory structure. They impose disclosure and other obligations on those who distribute the assets when they are the subject of an investment contract and give jurisdiction to the SEC on that basis. They also place limits on insider selling and take up other issues related to the assets. Both give jurisdiction to the SEC over the issuer or originator who conducts the distribution through an investment contract and jurisdiction over secondary markets to the CFTC (as noted above, Senate Agriculture must weigh in on those requirements). Both require rulemakings from the SEC and CFTC to accommodate these new requirements, with CLARITY specifying many new types of intermediaries under the CFTC’s purview and associated rulemakings. RFIA and CLARITY diverge in one more significant way. CLARITY imposes a “mature blockchain” requirement while RFIA does not. Mature blockchain is the key to allowing distributors to have lighter burdens, insiders to trade more freely, and escaping other requirements. While RFIA utilizes a “common control” concept to place or relieve limits on insider trading, it does not require a mature blockchain for any purposes. Still, the rapid pace of blockchain innovation may create practical challenges for designing and implementing an effective and lasting regulatory framework. Prescriptive definitions embedded in legislation may produce unintended downstream consequences that constrain innovation as the industry and applications of blockchain technology evolve. In other words, when Congress locks in a definition like “mature blockchain,” it risks boxing out some current innovators as well as tomorrow’s new innovations. And where the concept does not have a hard cut-over, the model risks inhibiting use cases as an asset shifts between SEC and CFTC oversight, creating uncertainty for all stakeholders and driving up legal and compliance costs. By contrast, a technology‑neutral, principles‑based approach, consistent with the SEC and CFTC submissions below, would maintain effective oversight while affording innovators the flexibility and regulatory certainty necessary to experiment and BUILD. Informing Regulation  While Congress is hard at work on legislation, we should not forget that the SEC and the CFTC have the ability to promulgate regulations. At the CFTC, Acting Chairman Pham has commenced a “crypto sprint” soliciting comments on how the agency might regulate crypto trading and other activities, first through a targeted request and then through a broader request aimed at addressing the recommendations from the President’s Working Group report. We submitted a comment letter in response to the first request, suggesting a framework by which the CFTC could allow its registered intermediaries to open the markets for protocol tokens, those tokens that are integral to the functioning of a protocol, whether blockchain, smart contract or otherwise.  Comments on the second request are due October 20, 2025. Over at the SEC, its Crypto Task Force has been actively soliciting information since February 21, 2025, with Commissioner Peirce’s speech laying out 48 topics on which to provide feedback. We submitted two comment letters. On April 23, 2025, we discussed token classification, decentralization, and the need to ensure that infrastructure providers are not confused with intermediaries. On May 27, 2025, we discussed the “nature of the activity” test as the means by which to evaluate whether an activity constituted intermediary or infrastructure services.   SEC Chairman Atkins gave an important speech on July 31, 2025, about American leadership in crypto and providing a high-level roadmap for the SEC to help achieve that goal. We responded with a comment letter on September 3, 2025 outlining a framework for the SEC to regulate pre-functionality offers and sales of protocol tokens as well as proposing rulemakings to allow SEC-regulated intermediaries to conduct trading and related activities in protocol tokens. With both agencies focused on developing regulations, through rulemaking, exemptive relief or otherwise, we expect to see initial output from both this fall. Stay Active and Engaged As Congress deliberates on how to implement an enduring and flexible approach to digital asset regulation and the SEC and CFTC invite comment on regulatory proposals, now is the time to educate, inform and advocate. Ava Labs and Avalanche Policy Alliance (our new name for Owl Explains!)  are proud to participate in many of the ongoing initiatives and advise on how the United States can maintain its global competitiveness in digital assets through public policy and regulation. For more information, see our resources page that includes explainers, articles, comment letters, and issue-specific material on DeFi, tokenization of assets, and stablecoins. Or give us a hoot! 

The Owl
By and The Owl